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POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY AND FOREIGN AID 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After a rapid rise and decline in the 1990s, political conditionalitiesi (PCs) have returned to 
the aid scene. Yet, post-2000 PCs are in many ways different from their 1990 predecessors. 
This article argues that a new generation of PCs has emerged during the last decade, which 
requires an expansion of the original research agenda studying the emergence, dynamics and 
effectiveness of PCS. In early research, PCs were defined as  
¶the use of pressure, by the donor government, in terms of threatening to terminate aid, or 
actually terminating or reducing it, if conditions are not met by the recipient· (Stokke 
1995:12).  
Most PCs (studied) were of the punitive, reactive kind, where aid providers wanted to sanc-
tion cases of human rights violations and democratic decay (i.e. Stokke 1995; Crawford 1997, 
2001; Uvin 1993). 
Many post 2000 PCs, however, do not fit this 1990s definition. The United States Millennium 
Challenge Account (founded in 2004) sets political threshold criteria which countries have to 
reach before they can profit from the initiative and which aim at incentivising recipients to 
reform without however interfering in domestic affairs (Woods 2005); the European Commis-
sion (EC) in 2007 launched the Governance Incentive Tranche, which was a topping up of the 
aid enveloppe (a reward) if recipient governments were willing to negotiate with the EU to 
implement political reforms (Molenaers 2009, 2011); the ÄGood Governance Contracts´ 
(2011) of the EC give more weight to political criteria before considering the provision of 
 2 
provide budget support (Faust et al 2012); recent discussions amongst EU member states ar-
guing that the European Development Fund (EDF) should become more selective regarding 
democratic governance and human rights; a number of bilateral donors have been experiment-
ing with splitting up aid disbursements in fixed and variable tranches, with the possibility of 
the latter being tied to the achievement of either negotiated (with recipient government), co-
ordinated (with other donors), or single handedly bilaterally identified political tar-
gets/indicators.  
The examples suggest that PCs can have democratic governance as an objective but also as a 
condition for aid. This broadening implies that PCs can reward and sanction, they can be pro-
active and reactive, hands-on (interfering in recipient domestic affairs) but also hands-off like 
the use of (political) selectivity criteria to allocate aid volumes or to choose certain modalities 
(such as budget support). 
Although PCs are broader in scope than during the 1990s, they are nonetheless narrower than 
the so-called ¶governance conditionalities· (e.g. Santiso 2001, 2002, 2004; Hayman 2011) 
which have been affected by a conceptual over-stretching of the governanceii term (Weiss 
2000; Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2010).iii We understand PCs as having an explicit focus on po-
litical regime and human rights issues. Corruption, in this regard, remains as an ambivalent 
issue. While for some donors, the anti-corruption agenda should be approached from a tech-
nocratic perspective, others claim there is a straightforward link with political accountability 
and political representation. Whether or not conditionalities attached to corruption fall into the 
realm of political conditionalities often depends on the framing and the proposed solutions. 
Against this background, we therefore suggest a modified definition of political conditionali-
ties and will refer to these PC as second generation PCs for (in?) the remainder of the textiv. 
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ÃPolitical conditionality refers to the allocation and use of financial resources (such as for-
eign aid) to sanction or reward recipients in order to promote democratic governance and 
human rights·.  
Our definition does not exclusively limit PCs to the aid domain. PCs can travel across policy 
domains. The EU, for example, is experimenting with human rights clauses in its trade 
agreements (see Koch, this volume). The legitimacy and effectiveness of climate funding (like 
aid) is also largely dependent on the socio-political conditions of recipient countries 
(Cammack 2007). And inspite of the declining importance and weight of aid itself, the post 
2015 global development agenda includes human rights and democratic governance concerns. 
In other words, PCs will not go away hence research and learning across the policy domains 
will remain important. 
Contributions in this special issue mostly focus on European foreign aid and the use of PCs by 
European donors. Why? First, the emergence of second generation of PCs has been quite visi-
ble in the EU context, because the EU is quite explicit about its political goals. Referred to as 
Normative Power when it comes to using civilian means for external democracy promotion 
(Manning 2002; Youngs 2004)v, and being awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace illustrate the 
importance of these political intensions. Second, the EU's accession process for example is 
often considered as one of the most interesting experiences of employing political condition-
ality successfully (e.g. Schimmelfennig & Scholz 2008). However, the EU is far from being a 
unitary actor. Foreign aid policies of the EC and member states have shown a great deal of 
heterogeneity which challenged the consistent and coherent use of PCs but at the same time 
also offers a fertile ground for analyzing the determinants, use and effectiveness of second 
generation PCs. 
The most important contribution of this introductory article relates to the mapping out of a 
new research agenda because broadened, diversified PCs also require the opening up of relat-
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ed research questions and perspectives. Beyond the traditional questions of use and effective-
ness, there is a need to dig deeper into the processes surrounding second generation PCs. 
There is a need to address the knowledge gaps regarding the bargaining processes and out-
comes along the aid chain -from domestic donor politics, donor harmonization fora, policy 
dialogue spaces to the political economy of recipient institutional reform and donor-coping 
strategies- because they influence the set-up, use, follow-up, purpose and effectiveness of 
PCs. Tackling these knowledge gaps also calls for cross fertilization between different schol-
arly traditions: the aid effectiveness debate, research on EU accession processes as well as the 
economic sanctions literature in International Relations all provide novel insights, even 
though they use different narratives and even different conceptualizations of conditionalitiesvi. 
In the same vein, research on the political economy of recipients institutional reform, on gov-
ernance and development can offer insights on enabling and constraining dynamics relating to 
political change (e.g. Haggard & Kaufman 1995). 
In sum, we provide a broader conceptual ground for analyzing second generation PCs. First 
we summarize the evolution towards second generation PCs. Second, we take look at the form 
these PCs have taken in broad typology distinguishing hands-off political selectivity and 
hands-on uses of aid as a lever for political change. Next, we ask what is known so far about 
(the effectiveness of) these second generation PCs. The concluding section zooms in on the 
gaps in our knowledge so far and draws out venues for, but also the limits of further research.  
 
 2. WHY DID POLITICAL CONDITIONALITIES RE-EMERGE ? 
(i) Shifting ideas about what aid should do 
In the early 1990s, the Ãvictory of democracy¶, the subsequent wave of democratization 
around the globe, the many intra-state conflicts, genocides and reversals to authoritarianism 
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all formed legitimizing building blocks for the use of first generation PCs. Notwithstanding 
the Ãenthusiasm¶ to push for democracy, research suggested that results were rather meager. 
PCs didn¶t work because donors did not coordinate which resulted in mixed signals, incen-
tives weren¶t big enough and PCs failed to build on domestic drives for political reform in the 
recipient country (Stokke 1995; Crawford 1997, 2001; Brown 2005).  
Second generation PCs re-emerged in the new millennium due to Ãthe governance turn of for-
eign aid¶, in combination with the events of 9/11, providing a new legitimacy push for democ-
racy. The prescriptions of aid effectiveness research in turn, provided a number of evidence 
based recommendations on how to make conditionalities more effective.  
The governance turn of aid started to take form in the second half of the nineties. The 1997 
World Development Report reassessed the role of the state in development, famously stating 
that ¶good government· was not a luxury that only developed countries could afford, but ac-
tually a key (pre)condition for development. This ¶good governance consensus· (Knack 2003) 
responded to the growing awareness that pervasive political institutions, including corruption, 
patronage but also authoritarian regimes were undermining economic reforms necessary for 
growth and broader measures of inclusive economic development (e.g. Knack & Keefer 1996, 
Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2002). Added to this some scholars argued that democracy 
also has a positive impact on economic development (e.g. Olson 1993; Lake and Baum 2001; 
Blaydes and Kayser 2011; Acemoglu et al 2014) 
Insights regarding the extrinsic valuevii of political institutions reshaped the terms of the aid 
effectiveness debate, as both policymakers and researchers became increasingly concerned 
with the mediating effects of recipient-side politics and institutions. The ¶Assessing Aid· re-
port (Dollar and Pritchett 1998) and other influential studies showed how the effect of foreign 
aid on economic development has been conditioned by the quality of the recipients' govern-
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ance. Not just technocratic governance (such as the quality of economic policies or public 
financial management) but also democratic governance mattered for effective aid (e.g. Svens-
son 1999; Kosack 2003, Burnside & Dollar 2004). Later on empirical enquiry also showed 
that foreign aid has helped entrench the regime in power, meaning that aid can consolidate 
autocratic structures (Djankov et al. 2008; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2011; Dutta, Leeson 
& Williamson 2013), strengthen personalist rule (Wright 2009) and foster patronage (Hodler 
& Raschky 2014). Moreover, aid had to address gradual changes in a myriad of governance 
dimensions, rather than a uniform and linear political transition from authoritarianism to de-
mocracy because an increasing number of recipient countries were now located in the grey 
areas between autocracy and liberal democracy, often labeled as hybrid regimes, anocracies or 
illiberal and defective democracies (e.g. Zakarias 1999; Croissant & Merkel 2000; Santiso 
2001).viii  
 
The above insights continuously prompted two different recommendationsix: aid should be 
given selectively to countries that have better scores on democratic governance, and aid 
should function as a lever for institutional (including political) change.  
(ii) Shifting ideas about how aid should be delivered 
Besides an enhanced idea of what aid should do (take into account and deal with governance 
issues in order to achieve poverty reduction), the way in which aid was delivered mattered 
too. Fragmented, donor-driven foreign aid and the use of conditionalities over which the re-
cipient had little ownership (also referred to as adversarial conditionalities) were to be avoid-
ed. More donor harmonization should overcome the perverse effects of projects on the admin-
istrative quality and political transparency of the recipients public sector (Knack & Rahmann 
2007; Djankov, Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2009; Bigsten & Tengstam 2014). More align-
ment to the recipient priorities and systems should enable the donors and recipient govern-
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ments to jointly negotiate over development targets and needed reforms, allowing for more 
recipient ownership and avoiding excessive donorship (Dollar and Pritchett 1998; Koeberle et 
al 2006).  
These new aid delivery principles, initially, were heavily geared towards supporting poverty 
reduction. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers launched by the World Bank (1999) to-
gether with the MDGs (2000) strongly pushed the idea that foreign aid should primarily aim 
at reducing poverty, while the Paris Declaration (2005) set out the aid delivery principles of 
recipient ownership, harmonization, alignment, results-orientation and mutual accountability.  
Interestingly, the use of more harmonized and aligned aid modalities such as multi-donor 
budget support, actually promoted or facilitated the use of PCs. Donor coordination mecha-
nisms and policy/political dialogues became crucial places to discuss development targets but 
also to tackle broader governance concerns, and to persuade the government into more trans-
parent and inclusive policy making, for example by requesting the involvement of civil socie-
ty in policy formulation. The increased high level interaction opportunities for aid agencies 
upgraded their potential influence (from project to policy level) and gave them additional fora 
to address governance concerns (De Haan and Everest Phillips 2005; Hayman 2011).  
The role of budget support merits particular attention in this context, because it became a cru-
cial instrument for supporting and inducing both technocratic and democratic governance 
reforms. Originally designed as the primary aid instrument for combating poverty and for 
improving related technocratic governance reforms in the area of public finance management 
(Koeberle and Stavreski 2006) it slowly developed into an instrument ²particularly for bilat-
eral donors- to tackle the democratic governance agenda (e.g. Hayman 2011; Faust, Leiderer 
and Schmitt 2012; Molenaers 2012). As such, budget support with its core elements of donor 
harmonization and alignment to recipients' priorities became a vehicle for the concomitant 
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and simultaneous promotion of democratic and technocratic governance and poverty reduc-
tion.  
3. WHAT DO SECOND GENERATION POLITICAL CONDITIONALITIES LOOK LIKE?  
(i) Political selectivity  
Aid should be given selectively to those countries that are well governed in order to increase 
aid effectiveness because the impact of aid on growth and poverty reduction is mediated by 
regime characteristics (Svensson 1999; Chauvet & Guillaumont 2002; Kosack 2003).  
The use of political selectivity criteria is a form of ex-post conditionality as foreign aid was 
supposed to be allocated and disbursed upon/after reaching governance thresholds or political 
reform achievements (Svensson 1999; Chauvet & Guillaumont 2002).x Democratic govern-
ance thus is a condition for aid (Santiso 2001), fully donor driven and hands-off (low interfer-
ence), since the donor decides unilaterally which criteria to use when allocating its foreign 
aid. 
According to Clist (2011) however, selectivity, can be multi-dimensional. Country allocation 
of aid volumes (and the use of political criteria in deciding over this) might be based on dif-
ferent criteria than the ones used for choosing aid modalities. Extending this argument one 
step further, one can also expect that the choice for certain sectors and even actors may be 
influenced by political considerations. 
(ii) Lever for political change 
In contrast to aid selectivity, using aid as a lever for political change implies that supporting 
democratic governance is an (intrinsic or extrinsic) objective rather than the condition for 
foreign aid (Santiso 2001). It also implies a more pro-active approach to promote or support 
political reforms. 
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 The ´Assessing aidµ report (1998) argued that traditional forms of aid conditionalities often 
failed because disbursements were made based on promised future reforms (ex-ante) over 
which recipient governments had little ownership. Consequently, the call for ex-post condi-
tionalities increased, particularly the idea that conditionalities had to be negotiated, preferably 
consensual, and results oriented so as to allow for ownership and more pluralism in terms of 
the possible policies a recipient government could implement (Dollar & Pritchett 1998; 
Koeberle and Stavreski 2006; Killick 1997). Moreover, the underlying idea is to strategically 
deliver aid to leverage the very political reforms which are meant to be conducive to econom-
ic development. Such a broad perspective to ´getting the incentives rightµ has led to highly 
diversified approaches to support or induce democratic governance. PCs can range from sub-
tle persuasion behind the closed doors of the policy dialogue to outspoken press statements 
condemning certain government actions (such as anti-gay bills or electoral fraud); monitoring 
the ¶good governance commitments· (or Underlying Principles) of the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding; using soft incentives (peer pressure, social control) through working groups in-
volving both state and non-state actors; negotiating hard incentives by pushing for political 
targets in the Performance Assessment Framework; the development of governance incentive 
tranches; suspending or reducing aid; shifting aid from one modality to another to reward de-
mocracy or to sanction regress; massaging governments into consultations with civil society; 
and this may go in tandem with ¶democracy promotion· activities such as funding political 
parties (including the opposition), funding civil society to play watchdog functions; support-
ing capacity development of parliament, etc« As such, the lines between democracy assis-
tance, democracy promotion and PCs have become very blurred, although all these forms of 
conditioning foreign aid were geared toward promoting democracy: either through govern-
ment structures or bypassing themxi. 
(iii) The grey zone between selectivity and lever for change 
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In reality, and over time, the distinction between selectivity and lever for change is often 
blurred. For example selectivity criteria can have a Ãlever for change¶ effect if the former are 
publicly announced by the donor, because the latter can have a signaling hence an incentive 
function, particularly if the reward (access to aid) is big enough compared to the cost the re-
cipient must bare when striving for the benchmark. Though in most cases, the establishment 
and use of selectivity criteria is a very opaque process, there are some notable exceptions. The 
Millenium Challenge Corporation is not only quite transparent about the criteria, it also offers 
some funding for countries that almost reach the threshold (http://www.mcc.gov/pages/about). 
Another exception is the World Bank with its CPIA scores and clear formulas on how they 
calculate volumes per country and the benchmarks used to allocate aid through Budget Sup-
port.  
Furthermore, selectivity does not imply that aid is subsequently disbursed without any strings 
attached. Aid always carries some implicit or explicit political conditions, and future dis-
bursements may thus be influenced by these. The implicit conditions often become explicit 
when problems occur in that specific area which in turn tend to lead to the use of explicit con-
ditions to redress the situation and/or ensure continued disbursement. 
Figure 1 below summarizes our broad typology.  
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3. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT SECOND GENERATION PCs? 
(i) Political Selectivity 
Large-N econometric studies have largely dominated allocation and selectivity research. It 
seems that donors have in general become more selective in their ODA-allocation patterns. It 
is however, unclear if and how political selectivity plays a role (e.g. Bourguignon & Sundberg 
2007; Dollar & Levin 2006; Clist 2011). At the same time, the Ãheterogeneity of donors¶ is 
remarkable. Differences between donors loom large in terms of the degree and the specific 
criteria of aid selectivity used (e.g. Alesina & Dollar 2000; McGillivray 2003; Neumayer 
2003; Hout 2007; Easterly & Williamson 2011). In general terms, the 4Ps (poverty, popula-
tion, policies and proximity) matter for the donor (Clist 2011) but the extent to which political 
criteria (regime issues recipient) enter into allocation decisions is unclear.xii Dollar & Levin 
(2006) looked into donor differences in selectivity and show that bilateral donors· aid alloca-
tion is more oriented towards political criteria, while multilateral organizations tend to give a 
stronger weight to the quality of economic governance. Donor characteristics matter too. 
Schudel (2008) shows that less corrupt donor countries will allocate more aid to less corrupt 
recipients. Interesting differences may also appear when distinguishing structural aid from 
humanitarian aid. Recipient needs might be more important for emergency aid, at least in the 
case of the USA (Kevlihan, DeRouen and Biglaiser, 2014).  
 
When taking the selectivity concept from country volume allocation down to modality choice  
less is known. Clist (2011) showed that the quality of recipient policies seems to matter more 
for donors at the level of aid modality choice, little research so far has focussed on this (see 
Winters & Martinez 2015). 
(ii) Lever for political change 
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First, a number of scholars look at aggregated ODA flows and are mainly interested in either 
impact on democratic institutions, or in the developmental impact of sanctioning democratic 
regress. Here, some authors have pointed to the possibilities of aid impacting democratic in-
stitutions (e.g. Finkel et al. 2006; Kalyvitis & Vlachaki 2010; Wright, 2010). Economic sanc-
tions scholars have looked into the effects of economic sanctions on regime. Particularly the 
work of Hufbauer et al (1985, 2007) has been ground breaking in refining the economic and 
political determinants of effective sanctions. The growing interest in the economic sanctions 
literature regarding the relation between effective economic sanctions and regime type 
showed that democracies are more vulnerable for certain types of sanctions than autocracies 
(e.g. Brooks, 2002; Allen, 2005, Major, 2012). Some large N-studies have looked into the 
effects of comprehensive economic sanctions on development, and conclude that they tend to 
have large unintended but detrimental effects on citizens in target countries. This has led to 
calls for using smart and targeted sanctions (Drezner 2011). 
 
An interesting tendency in this research stream is to acknowledge the Ãheterogeneity of aid¶ 
which points at the need to disaggregate aid flows in order to better unravel the use and effec-
tiveness of PCs as levers for political change. Dietrich and Wright (2012) for example looked 
at a particular aid flow, namely democracy aid, and showed that the impact of democracy aid 
is conditional on the domestic context in recipient countries. In a similar vein, the institutional 
context of autocracies also tended to condition the effects of foreign aid as authoritarian re-
gimes based on broader distribution coalitions will find it less riskier for their own political 
survival to engage in political liberalization (Wright 2009). These studies show that the lever-
age of overall and democracy aid on political liberalization is dependent on the political tra-
jectory of the recipient country.  
 
 13 
Next, a number of (comparative) case studies have been carried out looking at the different 
political conditionality instruments deployed, the goals attached to them, (versus) their set-up, 
implementation (challenges), subsequent bargaining processes and collective action problems 
both on the donor and on recipient side (e.g. Chhotray & Hulme 2009;  Borchgrevink 2008; 
Carey 2007; Emmanuel 2010). The interesting edge offered by some these studies, is that they 
give a rich description and analysis of the variety of tools used by donors. Discovering (what 
drives) this variety and complexity allows for further conceptualization and understanding of 
how donors deal with democratic governance challenges and to carry out more detailed analy-
sis on the motivations of donors, recipient coping strategies (e.g. Whitfield) and gradual, in-
cremental changes achieved by these instruments. Particularly with regards to the latter, very 
little evidence has been gathered so far (Grindle 2014). 
 
A number of influential case studies have particularly looked at EU conditionalities because 
the neighborhood policy and the EU´s Cotonou Partnership Agreement have been identified 
as relatively successful uses of PCs. In the case of the EUs neighborhood policy, the effec-
tiveness of political conditionality heavily relied on offering a big carrot: EU membership to a 
selected number of countries (e.g. Schimmelfennig 2007; Schimmelfennig and Scholz 2008). 
Membership negotiations were not only accompanied by a harmonized dialogue and monitor-
ing process but also by clear and consistent reform demands. From a recipient perspective, the 
perspective of becoming a EU member country provided substantial incentives in terms of 
market access and subsidies. Moreover, the ownership of potential members further increased, 
as they already had taken substantive steps toward democratization. The EU´s Cotonou Part-
nership Agreement and its possibility to use aid sanctions in the case of severe human rights 
violations under article 96 points to the similar requirements necessary for effective political 
conditionality: A comparatively high level of donor harmonization under the guidance of the 
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European Commission, an institutionalized political dialogue, comparatively clear benchmark 
criteria as well as high economic leverage (Portela 2007, 2012).  
(iii) More harmonized, more aligned, more effective PCs? 
Preference alignment - between donors or between donors and recipients - seems to be a 
daunting challenge, particularly when the number and heterogeneity of donors increases 
(Knack and Smets 2013; Bourguignon and Platteau 2015). Most case studies therefore show 
that in African, Asian and Latin American countries preference alignment, particularly be-
tween donors, has not been a success story. At best, jointly negotiated ex-post conditionalities 
were possible, or, donors  succeeded in giving a clear collective signal to the government, but 
it did not necessarily imply jointly agreed upon aid disbursement decisions (e.g. Aalen and 
Tronvoll 2008; Borchgrevink 2008; Hayman 2011). Even if goodwill in the field existed, 
without harmonization at the level of headquarters, all attempts remained quite limited. Even 
for the EU, which had proclaimed an important coordination role for itself, it has been a 
daunting task to get member states to engage in information exchange on sensitive political 
issues, to undertake joint governance assessments and to agree on whether or not to use PCs 
(e.g. Delputte 2013).xiii  
Some research on the stumbling blocks for preference alignment (and its effects) have been 
carried out (e.g. Bourguignon and Platteau 2015; Birdsall 2005; de Renzio 2006; Lancaster 
2007, Leininger & Grimm 2012; Bader & Faust 2014; Booth 2011; Knack/Rahmann 2007), 
but most of it are case studies. Most case studies zooming in on harmonization and alignment 
show that such interfaces provide space and opportunities to engage in the use of PCs. Partic-
ularly when budget support was provided. The fiduciary, accountability and political risks of 
this aid modality (e.g. Koeberle et al) made it prone to the use of political selectivity criteria 
and to (ad hoc) political conditionality because donor governments wanted to avoid parlia-
mentary and public opinion accusations that aid was propping up dictators or funding corrup-
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tion. Added to this, donors have also used PCs increase their visibility towards recipient gov-
ernment and/or within the donor group. The latter points at the importance of context in the 
recipient country. Donor landscape but also the bargaining position of the government influ-
ences the relation and leverage of donors, harmonization attempts and the use of PCs. In this 
sense the growth spurt in some recipient countries and alternative sources of foreign aid from 
China, India and other emerging powers has enabled recipient governments to become less 
aid dependent and/or thus better placed to resist political conditionalities (e.g. Furtado and 
Smith 2007; Hackenesch 2011)  
Most research looking into the dynamics of harmonization and alignment have been in-depth 
qualitative (comparative) case studies. Interestingly, this research has forcefully shown the 
importance of looking into the black box of both donor home politics and recipient home poli-
tics and the need to look into the complex dynamics that shape donors· leeway to engage with 
new aid principles and the recipients leeway to cope with political donor demands.  
4. A NEW RESEARCH AGENDA 
There are still many things to discover about PCs. Above all, research needs to catch up with 
the growing heterogeneity of donors, the heterogeneity of aid and how this interacts with PCs. 
Some knowledge gaps are evident. The myriad of domestic factors shaping conditionality 
bargains remain largely understudied. This is true for both the donor and recipient sides. Simi-
larly, we don¶t know enough about the dynamics of the bargain between donor and recipients, 
including crucial credibility and coordination issues. Our understanding of the politics under-
lying the choice of either political selectivity or lever-for-political-change forms of condition-
ality is also limited. We know even less about the tensions and policy dilemmas associated 
with these approaches and the grey zone between them. Some knowledge gaps correlate with 
research strategies. On the one hand, research on political selectivity (mirroring the allocation 
 16 
literature) is predominantly large-N and not followed by in-depth studies of mechanisms and 
processes. On the other hand, the large number of qualitiative studies on the use and effects of 
PCs in individual countries do not always accumulate into convincing evidence and/or lead to 
useful policy lessons.    
In order to address these knowledge gaps and integrate isolated research lines, this section 
maps out an analytical roadmap for studying the new generation of political conditionalities. 
The general argument is that the future PC research agenda studying PCs can look at or across 
different bargaining arenas: donor home politics, recipient political economy, and interface 
issues (donor-donor and donor-recipient interactions) (Figure 2).  
(i) Donor home politics 
Several articles in this volume explicitly examine how domestic dynamics shapes the use of 
political conditionality as a foreign policy/development promotion tool. Notwithstanding 
these valuable contributions, it remains by and large unclear how ideas, interests and institu-
tions affect the conceptualization, design and implementation of politically tied aid, and how 
this relates to donor variations in modes of accountability and representation. This points at 
the importance of studying key stakeholders, including pressure groups and influential NGOs. 
For example, the role of the media in framing the politics of foreign aid seems be crucial (Van 
Belle et al. 2004; Joly 2014). Yet, the systematic study of media representations and how its 
relates to the use of PC is still a largely under-researched area. The same holds for other key-
veto players such as parliaments, the NGO landscape and how they influence the use of PCs. 
Equally important and understudied is the link between PC and the institutional autono-
my/capacity of aid agencies, particularly vis-a-vis Foreign affairs and implementing agencies. 
The ideational side of donor politics is also a fertile ground for future research. We know that 
decisions regarding political conditionality are to a good extent taken to please domestic audi-
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ences (see the discussion on Molenaers et al., this volume).xiv This stresses the importance of 
analyzing public preferences on foreign aid in general and PC in particular as well as the ex-
tent to which governments are responsive to those preferences. More generally, a more sys-
tematic account of the influence of ideas in the evolution of PCs is in order. 
Figure 2: broad outline of research agenda 
 
A key issue is how, or indeed whetherxv, policy learning in the light of new evidence takes 
place. In this regard, it may be interesting to know how narratives of success and failure are 
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constructed and internalized in policy designs. Another potentially interesting area is the in-
ternational diffusion of political conditionality thinking and practices across donors and inter-
national agencies. De Felice (this volume) offers insights into this issue by comparing the 
experiences of France and the UK. This research may also engage the way influential epis-
temic communities contribute to the framing and promotion of policy paradigms.xvi   
(ii) Recipient political economy 
On the recipient side, the new generation of research is developing more nuanced accounts of 
how alternative conditionality frameworks may affect political opportunity structures, includ-
ing the dynamics of pro-reform and anti-reform coalitions and veto players. A very promising 
line of research is already exploring the way PCs play out in authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian (hybrid) regimes (see Hackenesh, this volume). Building on these inspiring  ef-
forts, researchers should pay closer attention to the domestic costs of compliance and their 
associated political drivers. Looking more carefully at what in the EU jargon is called the 
´goodness of fitµ (the gap between expected outcomes and underlying institutional and ideo-
logical structures) is key for understanding the possibilities and limits of political condition-
ality in different contexts. This also implies working with more subtle measures of policy 
outcomes, and not least of success and failure.  
Another promising avenue of inquiry lies in the intersection between the study of PC and the 
ever-growing literature on governance and development. Despite the huge amount of research 
in this area, our understanding of how aid may impact on poverty reduction and growth 
through institutions is still imperfect. Moreover, there is lack of consensus regarding whether 
it is a good idea to target political institutions in development interventions. One of the cur-
rent conundrums of global development thinking concerns the two major policy paths taken 
by the aid effectiveness debate following the Paris Declaration: the conditionality road and 
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the political economy road (Booth 2011).xvii Both approaches are predicated upon different 
understandings of the institutional underpinnings of development and by implication of the 
role of political conditionality. In the same vein, some ground-breaking works on political 
economy (e.g. North el al. 2009; Besley and Persson 2013) put forward innovative arguments 
which cut across debates about the logic and merits of PCs.  
Along similar lines, some scholars have been raising challenging questions regarding donors¶ 
capacity to leverage political change. Matt Andrews¶ (2013) book on the limits of institutional 
reform in development is a case in point. In a nutshell, Andrews explains why so many at-
tempts to engineer institutional change from abroad fail and formulates a more incremental, 
inclusive and ultimately realistic reform agenda.xviii The issue is whether and how conven-
tional understandings of PC, either as selectivity or lever for change, can accommodate a 
more context-specific, experimental and problem-driven approach to governance reforms. 
Whatever the answer, the lesson is that insights from the latest literature on governance and 
institutional reforms may inspire original research on the recipient side of conditionality.   
(iii) Interface issues 
Recent research on democracy support has called for more explicitly addressing the interac-
tion process between the democracy supporters and the recipients of this support (Leininger 
2012, Bader & Faust 2014). Seen from the particular perspective of political conditionality, 
conditionality implies an (implicit) aid contract between donors and recipients. The inherent 
interdependence between the two parties is marked by the pivotal issue of credibility, which 
intersects with conditionality in two fundamental ways. On the one hand, different forms of 
conditionality can be seen as attempts to address credibility issues. On the other hand, condi-
tionality bargains would inevitably be undermined by further credibility problems. The co-
nundrum is that institutional solutions to credible commitment are subject to further problems 
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of credible commitment (Bardhan 2005). In this context, seeking to disentangle how credibil-
ity dilemmas play out and are reconciled across different forms of conditionality should be an 
exciting theme in future research. 
Moreover, credibility may be a plausible entry point for closing a critical knowledge gap, the 
study of the multiple interface issues surrounding donors-recipient interactions. The core ana-
lytical themes here are donor-donor coordination and donor-recipient alignment (see Table 2).  
Regarding donor coordination, the last years have witnessed a substantial increase of research 
related to the ills of donor fragmentation (e.g. Knack/Rahmann 2007) but also to potential 
benefits of looking at the potential advantages of Ãfragmented¶ democracy support (e.g. Ziaja 
2013), or inversely, the perverse effects of preference alignment for democratic progress. Yet, 
more systematic analysis is needed on how the quality of coordination among donors effects 
the quality of the aid contract between donors and recipients and particularly the potential 
tensions between a coherent external incentive scheme and the principle of alignment towards 
the policy priorities of a the recipient. Given that an increase in the coherency of conditionali-
ty will affect the actual bargaining situation, one may plausibly ask, for example, how power 
asymmetries affect the content, negotiation (dialogue fora) and implementation of PCs.xix 
Moreover, given the heterogeneity of donor agencies, the landscape of donor agencies should 
be addressed more systematically. Beyond the sheer number of donor agencies, the type - e.g. 
financial vs. technical cooperation, the differences among them in financial and political 
weight and the presence of BRICs and non-DAC actors should affect the levels of coordina-
tion and alignment and therefore the quality of the aid contract(s) related to political condi-
tionalities. Against the background of Reinsberg¶s findings (in this volume) that the World-
Bank responds differently to political liberalization than the EC and particularly bilaterals 
donors, one could more systematically tackle the question, if major donors such as the World-
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bank, the EC or some major bilateral donors try to shape the way political conditionality en-
ters into aid contracts. 
As for donor-recipient alignment, it is important to go deeper into the factors shaping the ac-
tual bargaining of PCs. One may plausibly ask, for example, how pervasive power asymme-
tries affect the negotiation and implementation of PCs conditionalities.xx But interface issues 
like the quality of policy/political dialogue may also be important. 
Another promising field for further research concerns the study of the tensions across arenas 
of interaction. This is relevant because apparently optimal ³within-arena´ policy innovations 
tend to have unintended consequences in other arenas which are often overlooked. To put it 
simply, attempts to address credibility issues on the recipient side may lead to problems on 
the donor side and viceversa. A related issue is how different forms of PCs impact on the 
³policy spaces´ and eventually on the behavior of both donors and recipients. These interac-
tions have massive implications. For example, the viability of a more experimental approach 
to political change depends on donors¶ capacity to credibility commit to the more realistic, 
though diminishing expectations of ³good-enough governance´ in the face of public opinion 
and media pressures. The logic of µtwo-level games¶ (Putman 1988) may be a useful analyti-
cal tool for approaching these crucial tensions and interactions.     
The above-mentioned research avenues should be core building blocks in the next generation 
of research on political conditionalities. That said, the following three research tasks are also 
essential. Firstly, concept formation. The attachment of political conditions to aid is often 
packaged in varied and subtle ways.xxi This means that researchers should develop refined 
conceptualisations and typologies (see Koch, this volume). Secondly, measurement. One of 
the main lessons of economic sanctions literature is its commitment to the systematic docu-
mentation of events, the constant improvement of measurement strategies, and the attention 
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given to causality. This lesson should motivate research on PCs (see Molenaers et al., this 
volume), not least in relation to the elusive issue of effectiveness. Thirdly, and finally, 
knowledge accumulation. The research efforts produced across the different avenues of in-
quiry should be consolidated and synthesized. This includes the integration of findings from 
both large-N and case studies. Building on the ethos of µworking together¶ (Poteete et al. 
2010), the articles of this volume illustrate how multiple analytical perspectives and methods 
can be brought to bear on complex development  problems. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS: UNRESOLVED POLICY DILEMMAS 
Good governance produces higher development dividends, and makes aid more effective. 
Scientific research has been less clear though, about which dimensions of governance matter 
more, in which sequencing orderxxii, how exactly to craft, reform and/or improve the function-
ing and performance of political institutions, and how exactly such improvements may inter-
act with developmental progress. Tampering with political institutions may negatively impact 
political stability, it may interrupt a continuous effort to reform the economy towards higher 
productivity, or, it can do exactly the opposite. Added to this, the time horizon taken by many 
social scientists is often long-term and allows for the detection of patterns, while donors and 
policy makers have to deal with the messy reality of interpreting short term events. This is 
particularly challenging in hybrid regimes, where it is difficult to interpret and assess the 
meaning of events in relation to the broader trends of democratic governance and/or political 
reforms. In that sense, neither empirical research on the determinants of democratization or 
democratic breakdown nor an increasing amount of more practitioner-oriented political econ-
omy frameworks provide clear answers to these policy challenges. Is a detected corruption 
scandal a sign of weakening state institutions or does it provide evidence for strengthening 
accountability mechanisms? Are elections won by the incumbent government in a hybrid re-
gime a step towards democratization or are they a well-calculated means for securing power? 
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Does a NGO law serve the purpose of bringing the state back in into an under-regulated arena 
of state society relations or is it a means to restrict civil society from expressing its legitimate 
interests? It is easy to prescribe the need for a shared understanding about the dynamics of the 
political process in a concrete country setting, but how to get to such an understanding is a 
whole other matter. 
Against this background, it is therefore of little surprise that donor governments, aid agencies 
and civil society actors often resort to normative claims and remain far from being united in 
their views and preferences regarding core questions related to political conditionality. While 
some actors question the desirability and legitimacy of political interference based on the idea 
that national sovereignty is to be respected, others reason that ¶richer countries· should refrain 
from supporting autocratic rulers, or inversely should not shy away from taking up responsi-
bility vis-à-vis the suppressed citizens in recipient countries. Such normative arguments are 
also present in the social science debate. While neo-colonial studies are particularly skeptical 
regarding normative grounds for political conditionality, liberals would claim that democratic 
governance and human rights provide good normative grounds for providing aid more selec-
tively.  
Finally, the whole aid-debate is caught up in witnessing a rapidly changing world, a further 
proliferation of aid actors, the decreasing importance of aid in middle income countries, the 
multiple and complex governance challenges in fragile states, the pressing need to incorporate 
the care of global public goods (climate) without robbing countries from their right to devel-
op, the challenge of dealing with emerging powers and the collective action problems related 
to fiscal austerity in many European countries. All of these factors add to the controversy of 
what international financial transfers should do versus what they can do. How to incorporate 
human rights and democracy concerns will remain a crucial part and parcel of these debates. 
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i
 We differentiate between political conditionalities and policy conditionality, the former referring to 
political criteria such as human rights, the rule of law and democratic governance and the latter being 
linked to policy content in specific policy fields such as macroeconomic management and regulation, 
public financial management or particular sectors such as health or education. Some scholars have 
referred to the existence of 4 generations of conditionalities: SAPs in the 80s, Political conditionalities 
of the 90s, the poverty reduction conditionalities by the late 90s, and the post 2000 partnership-based 
conditionalities (cfr Hayman 2011).   
ii
 The meaning, scope and implications change depending on the increasing elasticity and intrinsic 
vaguenness of the idea of governance. For example Kaufmann et al. define governance involves voice 
and accountability, political stability, control of corruption, but also rule of law, regulatory quality and 
government effectiveness. 
iii
 In the context of the aid effectiveness debate, the governance term was launched by the World Bank 
and IMF during the late 1980s and 1990s to address more technical reform issues mostly within the 
realm of administrative modernization (Santiso 2002). Yet, soon the term also incorporated political 
dimensions (Leftwich 1996). This has led to confusing uses of the governance concept and blurred 
lines between specific categories of democracy enhancing aid such as democracy promotion, democ-
racy assistance and governance aid (Santiso 2001). 
iv
 Referring to second generation PCs does not aim to suggest an abrupt break with first generation 
PCs (1990s). Rather the contrary, the move into second generation conditionalities has been gradual 
and slow, and hence there are similarities between both generations.donors have also used aid to sanc-
tion democratic regress and human rights abuses such as electoral fraude, coup d¶ptats, and anti-gay 
bills in recipient countries. These included the implementation of conditionality for such diverse issues 
as anti-gay bills or the criminalization of homosexuality, discriminatory laws against women, electoral 
fraud, repression of opposition, etc. For case study evidence on the application of these aid sanctions 
see for example Borchgrevink 2008; Hackenesch 2011; Aalen & Tronvol 2008; Furtado & Smith 
2007; de Renzio 2006 ; Beswick 2011 ; Schmidt 2011 ; Resnick 2011 ; Fisher 2011 ; Portela 2010; 
Hayman 2011; Faust et al 2012. 
v
 Recent Eurobarometer research (2012) has also shown that European citizens prefer aid to strengthen 
Human Rights and Democracy above anything else, and that political conditionalities are considered a 
legitimate aid instrument to push for democratic reform. 
vi
 Particularly the definition of ex-ante and ex-post (before or after what?) is quite different. EU-
accession studies refer to the agreement to determine ex-ante or ex-post, while most aid effectiveness 
studies regarding conditionalities take disbursement as the reference point. Such differences in con-
ceptualization may lead to -at first sight- contradictory results when looking into effectiveness issues, 
hence the importance of clearly defining and operationalizing the crucial concepts. Furthermore, EU 
studies often portray a relatively powerful external agent (the EU) using conditionality as a strategy to 
induce policy and/or political changes according to EU standards and values in politically relevant 
countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004) and looking into the role of veto-players in EU poli-
cy making (Borzel et al 2011). In the aid literature, conditionality refers to how donor imposed con-
straints on the delivery of aid might persuade a recipient government to behave in certain ways (Gib-
son et al. 2005). In research on economic sanctions, a sender seeks to discipline target countries by 
strategically imposing, or threatening to impose, economic hardship. In all cases, the analytic and pol-
icy focus is on whether and how the ³incentives´ embedded in different conditionality arrangements 
can/may shape the behavior of key actors involved in the bargain. 
vii
 Promoting democracy can also be done because of intrinsic values of course. The aid effectiveness 
debate however most often referred to the extrinsic value of democracy for economic development. 
viii
 This proliferation has led some authors to criticize the µreform overload¶ in governance and the 
overly ambitious aspirations of donors (e.g. Merilee Grindle on Good Enough Governance). 
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ix
 In research this led to a proliferation of efforts aimed at measuring democracy, governance, and 
human rights (Kaufmann et al. 2000; Knack 2003; Landman and Hausermann 2003). In the real world, 
new global actors advocating good governance emerged (e.g. Transparency International, launched in 
1995). 
x
 The change from ex-ante conditionality (aid is disbursed based on promised future reforms) to ex-
post conditionality (aid is disbursed after reaching threshold criteria or reform achievements) was an-
other major recommendation from the "assessing aid" report and also influenced by increasing insights 
about the adverse effects of structural adjustment programs with ex-ante conditionality (e.g.  Easterly 
2002, 2005).  
xi
 The upside of this proliferation is that it allows, at least in theory, for a diversified approach which 
may take the form of a µpolitical portfolio-approach¶ or a µdemocratic governance portfolio¶ where 
complex goals such as democratic governance are tackled from multiple entry points, with multiple 
instruments and modalities, in multiple sectors and supporting different actors. 
xii
 On these different drivers of aid allocation see also Svensson 2000, Neumayer 2003; Berthelemey 
2006; Carey2007; Lancaster 2007. 
xiii
 Some research has looked into the collective action problems of donors and the link with condi-
tionalities. Large N-research showed that the more donors present in a country, the higher the likeli-
hood that conditionalities will be used (Knack & Smets 2012).Also the rapid emergence of new pri-
vate aid players (such as vertical funds) and the BRICs which were less affected by/interested in the 
governance turn of aid or the changed aid delivery principles (let alone concerns about governance), 
exarcerbated the collective action problems between traditional donors. 
xiv
 We should also take into account that governments in recipient countries also face incentives to use 
conditionality bargains to send µsignals¶ to foreign audiences. See, e.g. Andrews¶ (2013) account of 
the signaling effects driving institutional reforms in developing countries.  
xv
 Some development ideas tend to be resilient even in the presence of strong disconfirmatory evi-
dence, simply because they are politically attractive/profitable (see Booth 2011).  
xvi
 In this area, the new literature on the politics of policy ideas may be inspiring. See especially 
Beland and Cox (2010) and Blyth (2013).  
xvii
 According to Booth, the conditionality path implies a reversion to political conditionality with 
enhanced emphasis on the use of indicators of institutional and governance quality. Alternatively, the 
political economy road is about understanding the deeper institutional roots of development with an 
eye on informing a more flexible, nuanced approach to aid and institutional change.   
xviii
 This echoes previous contributions by Grindle (2004), Evans (2004), Rodrik (2009) and many 
others. 
xix
 This is an area where counterintuitive findings may turn up. As Schelling famously argued, in bargaining 
weakness is often strength (and viceversa).   
xx
 This is an area where counterintuitive findings may turn up. As Schelling famously argued, in bar-
gaining weakness is often strength (and viceversa).   
xxi
 In the extreme, the use of political conditionalities remains hidden behind politically correct rheto-
ric. The case of budget support suspensions is a case in point (see Molenaers et al, this volume).   
xxii
 Merilee Grindle is one of the few academics who has undertaken a valuable attempt at prioritizing 
governance reforms while proposing an analytical scheme to map and address reform bottlenecks. 
